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Phenomenal Presence$
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Fabian Dorsch and Fiona Macpherson

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780199666416

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199666416.001.0001

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Object Seeing and Spatial Perception

Object Seeing and Spatial Perception

(p.134) 6 Object Seeing and Spatial Perception
Phenomenal Presence

Craig French

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers the Spatiality Claim: if one sees an object then one sees some of that object’s spatial properties. The author considers an argument for this given by Cassam (2007), and challenges Cassam’s argument. His argument involves the idea, inspired by Dretske (1969), that seeing an object requires visual differentiation. But, it is argued here, there are prima facie counter-examples to the visual differentiation condition. Next, the author discusses the Spatiality Claim directly, and defends it against potential counter-examples which come from reflection on empirical cases where subjects can see objects yet have some sort of spatial perception deficit. One theme that emerges is that insofar as versions of the Spatiality Claim are defensible, we should focus on the relatively determinable spatial properties of objects and our perception of such properties.

Keywords:   spatial perception, seeing, determinable properties, visual differentiation, spatial properties

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