This concluding chapter argues that the EuroTragedy was that critics—outsiders and insiders—warned of the euro's economic flaws and the likely political damage it could do. Wrapped in an obsessive groupthink, European leaders portrayed the single currency as a “pro-European” enterprise. However, the euro delivered none of the economic benefits promised. Some analysts had predicted that the euro would cause the share of trade between Eurozone countries to increase; instead, even before the global crisis had started in 2007, the share of within-Eurozone trade had started declining and that tendency accelerated after the crisis began. When the inevitable financial crisis came—first as a global crisis and then as a rolling Eurozone crisis—the euro caused the most damage in the weakest Eurozone countries, widening existing income disparities. The chapter then points to specific measures to improve the functioning of the Eurozone.
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