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The Primacy of Metaphysics

Christopher Peacocke

Abstract

Is the metaphysics of a domain prior in the order of philosophical explanation to a theory of intentional contents and meanings about that domain? Or is the opposite true? This book argues from the nature of meaning and intentional content to the conclusion that content and meaning are never prior to the metaphysics. For every domain, either a metaphysics-first view or a no-priority view is correct. Metaphysics-first views are developed for several specific domains. For extensive magnitudes, a new realistic metaphysics is developed, and this metaphysics is used to explain features of the perce ... More

Keywords: metaphysics, meaning, intentional content, magnitudes, time, number, self, first person, limits of intelligibility, analogue

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780198835578
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2019 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198835578.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Christopher Peacocke, author
Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy / Honorary Fellow, Columbia University / Institute of Philosophy, University of London