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Interpretive Social ScienceAn Anti-Naturalist Approach$
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Mark Bevir and Jason Blakely

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198832942

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832942.001.0001

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Public policy

Public policy

Chapter:
(p.179) 9 Public policy
Source:
Interpretive Social Science
Author(s):

Mark Bevir

Jason Blakely

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198832942.003.0009

Readers are introduced to how an anti-naturalist framework can ground a distinctively deliberative and interpretive turn in public policy. Over the last three decades there has been an important shift among a minority of public policy scholars toward interpretive and deliberative modes that are critical of naturalism’s justification of rule by supposedly scientific experts of human behavior. Like the interpretive turn more generally, this deliberative remaking of public policy has drawn on a great diversity of philosophical sources, including phenomenology, discourse theory, Dewey’s pragmatism, and post-structuralism. While we embrace the fact that this transformation of policy discourse and practice can be reached by a variety of philosophical routes, we also argue that an anti-naturalist framework can clarify certain confusions that cloud these debates.

Keywords:   deliberative policy, dialogical approaches, rule by experts, humanism, public policy

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