Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
EU Fiscal Policy Coordination in Hard TimesFree Riders on the Storm$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Charlotte Rommerskirchen

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198829010

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198829010.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 06 July 2020

Discretion Rather Than Rules

Discretion Rather Than Rules

(p.90) 6 Discretion Rather Than Rules
EU Fiscal Policy Coordination in Hard Times

Charlotte Rommerskirchen

Oxford University Press

Solutions to free riding, whether stability or growth free riding, are thought to be found in the provision of incentives. Yet the empirical findings of this chapter suggest that domestic fiscal rules, such as debt brakes, did not impact on the fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession. Similarly, EU-level agreements (the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the newly created European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP)) did not impact on fiscal policy choices. First, the majority of domestic fiscal rules were equipped with exceptionality clauses. As a result, they did not impose stern constraints on fiscal policy in hard times. Second, the EERP and SGP were meaningless for fiscal policy outcomes; member states adopted stimulus programs as they saw fit with little concern for EU-level agreements or EU-wide aims for stability and growth.

Keywords:   fiscal rules, fiscal stimulus, Stability and Growth Pact, European Economic Recovery Plan, exceptionality, European Commission

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .