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Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2$
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Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198815259

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198815259.001.0001

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Personal Identity and Persisting as Many

Personal Identity and Persisting as Many

Chapter:
(p.213) 9 Personal Identity and Persisting as Many
Source:
Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2
Author(s):

Sara Weaver

John Turri

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198815259.003.0010

Many philosophers hypothesize that our concept of personal identity is partly constituted by the one-person-one-place rule, which states that a person can only be in one place at a time. This hypothesis has been assumed by the most influential contemporary work on personal identity. This chapter reports a series of studies testing whether the hypothesis is true. In these studies, people consistently judged that the same person existed in two different places at the same time. This result undermines some widely held philosophical assumptions, supports others, and fits well with recent discoveries on identity judgments about inanimate objects and non-human animals.

Keywords:   personal identity, thought experiment, transplant case, teletransportation, Derek Parfit, social cognition

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