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In the Light of ExperienceNew Essays on Perception and Reasons$
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Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning, and Søren Overgaard

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198809630

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198809630.001.0001

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World in Mind

World in Mind

Extending Phenomenal Character and Resisting Skepticism

Chapter:
(p.213) 8 World in Mind
Source:
In the Light of Experience
Author(s):

Heather Logue

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198809630.003.0010

I will begin this paper by sketching a view according to which perceptual phenomenal character is “extended”, in the sense of literally incorporating mind-independent entities in the subject’s environment (a view also known as Naïve Realism or the Relational View). I will then argue that this metaphysical thesis about perceptual phenomenal character affords a novel version of epistemological disjunctivism (a view that is elaborated and defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard). I will conclude by comparing the resulting view with other versions of epistemological disjunctivism, and arguing that the version I have offered provides the most satisfying response to external world skepticism.

Keywords:   perception, perceptual experience, external world skepticism, disjunctivism, phenomenal character, Naïve Realism, extended mind hypothesis

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