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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 8$
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Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198806967

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198806967.001.0001

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Cumulative Case Arguments in Religious Epistemology

Cumulative Case Arguments in Religious Epistemology

(p.1) 1 Cumulative Case Arguments in Religious Epistemology
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 8

Robert Audi

Oxford University Press

Philosophers and others characteristically give multiple arguments for their important controversial views. Why is one good argument not enough? Most philosophers would perhaps agree to this much: at their best, arguments are paths to understanding, pillars of conviction, providers of confirmation, and nourishment for the intellect. But how should we unpack these metaphors? This paper attempts to contribute to that task. It shows why a good cumulative case should not be identified with a conjunctive one (culminating in a single argument with all the relevant premises conjoined), and it brings out how propositional and non-propositional grounds differ significantly from one another but can be integrated into a unified case for what they mutually support.

Keywords:   commensurability, conjunctivity, inference to the best explanation, justification, knowledge, probability, religious experience

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