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Corporate Governance in Contention$
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Ciaran Driver and Grahame Thompson

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198805274

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198805274.001.0001

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Protecting Long-term Commitment

Protecting Long-term Commitment

Legal and Organizational Means

(p.42) 3 Protecting Long-term Commitment
Corporate Governance in Contention

Kevin Levillain

Simon Parker

Rory Ridley-Duff

Blanche Segrestin

Jeroen Veldman

Hugh Willmott

Oxford University Press

Growing attention is being paid to the benefits of considering the long-term interests of multiple constituencies in corporate governance. A theory of the corporation where fiduciary duties of directors point to the legal entity and not to its shareholders goes beyond a pure prioritization of shareholders’ interests. However, the notion that board members mediate the interests of all constituencies fails to account for a ‘positive’ conception of corporate purpose and underlying asymmetries in allocations of rights between stakeholders. Addressing corporate governance as a fundamentally ‘open’ model for organizational structuring, we engage with a variety of legal mechanisms that can be used to implement and protect a positive purpose for the modern corporation and to protect the conditions of credible commitment to manage the company for the interest of corporate constituencies, to commit the corporation to a social or environmental purpose and to take into account multiple time-horizons.

Keywords:   Corporate governance, corporate architecture, social enterprise, profit with purpose, long-term organization

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