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Knowledge, Belief, and GodNew Insights in Religious Epistemology$
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Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198798705

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198798705.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 November 2019

Testimony, Error, and Reasonable Belief in Medieval Religious Epistemology

Testimony, Error, and Reasonable Belief in Medieval Religious Epistemology

Chapter:
(p.29) 2 Testimony, Error, and Reasonable Belief in Medieval Religious Epistemology
Source:
Knowledge, Belief, and God
Author(s):

Richard Cross

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198798705.003.0003

Aquinas generally adopts a fallibilist epistemology, according to which it is often impossible to have good internalist justification for a belief. In line with this, he adopts a fully externalist account of the reasonableness of divine faith. Faith is justified if and only if it is caused in the believer by God. Scotus is more optimistic about the prospects for internalist justification generally. Hence, he believes that it is possible to have justified belief even on the basis of merely human testimony. The views that the two thinkers adopt on the theological question are thus wholly parasitic on prior epistemological commitments.

Keywords:   Aquinas, Scotus, fallibilism, internalism, epistemic justification, religious belief

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