Using Traditional Jus in Bello Conditions to Model the Relationship Between Liability and Lesser-Evil Justifications for Killing in War
This chapter attempts to explain how liability and lesser-evil justifications can work together, in an individualist account of just war, to answer some difficult questions about fighting in war. It starts with a brief survey of other individualist attempts to make sense of jus in bello in general and proportionality in bello in particular. It argues that the traditional jus in bello conditions and the separation of labor between them can be helpful, as a model, for understanding exactly how liability and lesser-evil justifications are meant to work together to account for some of our intuitions regarding the more difficult cases of collective action and limited or minimal moral responsibility in war. One upshot of this account is that it gives us reasons to reject the view that a complex picture of justification for actions in war needs to commit us to pacifism.
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