This chapter offers an in-depth discussion of the concept of intentionality from neo-behaviorist, neo-pragmatist, and enactivist perspectives. It argues that intentionality need not be conceived in representationalist terms, and that both phenomenology and pragmatism point to a more basic form of non-derived intentionality—the notion of operative intentionality, which is embodied in motoric, action-related processes, and embedded in socially situated behavior. Concepts of intentionality also reflect specific conceptions of social cognition. The enactive, neo-pragmatic, operative concept of intentionality turns out to be the relevant concept needed to support enactivist and extended mind approaches to understanding mind. Operative (embodied, motoric) intentionality is shown to be the real original or non-derived intentionality generated in our interactions with others.
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