Core Criteria and General Expectations
This chapter addresses the main roadblock to offering an account of the distinctly epistemic standards governing knowledge, once we assume that these involve both a reliability and a responsibility dimension. The problem is that no such account of epistemic justification can be unified and well motivated. Against this, the author argues that the key to providing such an account is to recognize a feature of evaluative assessment generally. It is argued that assessments of epistemic justification—and hence of epistemic propriety—involve two distinct determinations, one concerning whether the explicit epistemic criteria were satisfied, the other concerning whether the general expectations we bring to bear in epistemic assessment were satisfied.
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