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To the Best of Our KnowledgeSocial Expectations and Epistemic Normativity$
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Sanford C. Goldberg

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198793670

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198793670.001.0001

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Epistemic Assessment

Epistemic Assessment

Core Criteria and General Expectations

Chapter:
(p.48) 2 Epistemic Assessment
Source:
To the Best of Our Knowledge
Author(s):

Sanford C. Goldberg

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198793670.003.0003

This chapter addresses the main roadblock to offering an account of the distinctly epistemic standards governing knowledge, once we assume that these involve both a reliability and a responsibility dimension. The problem is that no such account of epistemic justification can be unified and well motivated. Against this, the author argues that the key to providing such an account is to recognize a feature of evaluative assessment generally. It is argued that assessments of epistemic justification—and hence of epistemic propriety—involve two distinct determinations, one concerning whether the explicit epistemic criteria were satisfied, the other concerning whether the general expectations we bring to bear in epistemic assessment were satisfied.

Keywords:   epistemic assessment, evaluative assessment, normativity, reliability, responsibility

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