No Platforming
No Platforming
This paper explains how the practice of “no platforming” might be reconciled with a liberal politics. While opponents say that no platforming flouts ideals of open public discourse, and defenders that it is a justifiable harm-prevention measure, both sides mistakenly treat the debate like a run-of-the-mill free speech conflict, rather than a specific issue of academic freedom. Content-based restrictions on speech in universities are ubiquitous. This is no affront to a liberal conception of academic freedom, whose purpose is not just to protect the speech of academics, but also to protect academics’ rights to determine which views and speakers have sufficient disciplinary credentials to receive a hearing in academic contexts. No platforming should therefore be acceptable to liberals, in principle, in cases where it is used to support a university culture that maintains rigorous disciplinary standards, by denying attention and credibility to speakers who fall short of those standards.
Keywords: academic freedom, free speech, liberalism, no platforming, universities
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