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Epistemic Consequentialism$
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H. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198779681

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198779681.001.0001

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Epistemic Consequentialism and Epistemic Enkrasia

Epistemic Consequentialism and Epistemic Enkrasia

Chapter:
(p.290) 12 Epistemic Consequentialism and Epistemic Enkrasia
Source:
Epistemic Consequentialism
Author(s):

Amanda Askell

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0013

Askell investigates what the epistemic consequentialist will say about epistemic enkrasia principles, principles that instruct one not to adopt a belief state that one takes to be irrational. She argues that a certain epistemic enkrasia principle for degrees of belief can be shown to maximize expected accuracy, and thus that a certain kind of epistemic consequentialist is committed to such a principle. But this is bad news for such an epistemic consequentialist, according to Askell, because epistemic enkrasia principles are problematic.

Keywords:   epistemic enkrasia, expected accuracy, epistemic consequentialism, rationality

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