Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198779667

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198779667.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 May 2020



The Epistemic Condition

(p.1) Introduction
Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition
Jan Willem Wieland
Oxford University Press

This Introduction provides an overview of the current state of the debate on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. Its main goal is to offer a framework that contextualizes the chapters that follow. Section 1 discusses the main concepts of ‘ignorance’ and ‘responsibility’. Section 2 asks why agents should inform themselves. Section 3 describes what is taken to be the core agreement among the main participants in the debate. Section 4 explains how this agreement invites a regress argument with a revisionist implication. Section 5 provides an overview of the main responses to the regress argument. Section 6 addresses the question of why blameless ignorance excuses. Section 7 describes further issues that are addressed in the book. Section 8 concludes with some discussion of future directions the debate might take.

Keywords:   responsibility, ignorance, knowledge, excuse, blameworthiness, epistemic condition, quality-of-will, reasonable expectation, benighting act, unwitting act

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .