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On What MattersVolume Three$
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Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198778608

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.001.0001

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Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons

Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons

Chapter:
(p.291) 51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons
Source:
On What Matters
Author(s):

Derek Parfit

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0016

This chapter presents two claims. The first is that no fact could give us a reason if we could not possibly be aware of this fact, or our awareness of this fact could not possibly motivate us. Next is that the moral wrongness of an act cannot give us a reason if we could not possibly believe that such acts are wrong. To both these claims, the chapter maintains an externalist view in accepting these claims. However, it also rejects the claim that an act's wrongness cannot give us a reason unless our belief that this act is wrong would actually motivate us. With several more claims regarding moral accountability and blameworthiness, this chapter makes further arguments concerning the true beliefs about reasons that are considered either externalist or objectivist.

Keywords:   morality, moral accountability, blame, blameworthiness, internal reasons, moral wrongness, reason

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