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Non-Propositional Intentionality | Oxford Scholarship Online
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Non-Propositional Intentionality

Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague

Abstract

This book is about the possibility and the prospects of making sense of non-propositional intentionality. Intentionality lies at the centre of a great deal of the philosophy of mind and, by and large, it is understood in propositional terms. Typically, the examples of intentionality deemed fundamental and the explanations of their natures rely on the idea of propositional content. But these commitments cannot go unquestioned and the (often implicit) acceptance of “propositionalism” has impeded philosophical discussion about the nature of intentionality in at least three noteworthy ways: (i) a ... More

Keywords: Intentionality, propositional attitudes, philosophy of mind, propositional content, propositionalism

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780198732570
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2018 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198732570.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Alex Grzankowski, editor
Lecturer in Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London

Michelle Montague, editor
Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, Austin