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Explaining KnowledgeNew Essays on the Gettier Problem$
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Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter D. Klein

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198724551

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001

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Closure, Counter-Closure, and Inferential Knowledge

Closure, Counter-Closure, and Inferential Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.312) 18 Closure, Counter-Closure, and Inferential Knowledge
Source:
Explaining Knowledge
Author(s):

Branden Fitelson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0019

The chapter begins with some general remarks about closure and counter-closure, and is followed with a discussion of the following: I (a) review some (alleged) counterexamples to counter-closure, I then continue by (b) discussing a popular strategy for responding to such counterexamples to counter-closure, and finally I (c) pose a dilemma for this popular strategy. Once I have discussed these three points I conclude the chapter by proposing that we reject counter-closure, but at the same time that we accept an epistemological package that includes closure and another intuitively plausible principle with regards to the psychology and epistemology of deductive inference.

Keywords:   Gettier, closure, counter-closure, false lemmas, deduction

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