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Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory$
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Fiona Macpherson and Fabian Dorsch

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198717881

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198717881.001.0001

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Aristotle on Distinguishing Phantasia and Memory

Aristotle on Distinguishing Phantasia and Memory

Chapter:
(p.9) 2 Aristotle on Distinguishing Phantasia and Memory
Source:
Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory
Author(s):

R. A. H. King

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198717881.003.0002

Aristotle is the first philosopher to give an account of memory based on phantasia, a very broad, non-cognitive power of the soul. But how he distinguishes phantasia when not used in memory, from memory, is not easy to say. Two fundamental strategies for making this contrast may be crudely distinguished—we may call their proponents ‘the Activist’ and ‘the Phenomenalist’. An Activist will say that Aristotle will say: imagining is doing something different from remembering. A Phenomenalist will say that memories and imaginings appear different to their subject. The aim of this chapter is to show that neither Phenomenalist nor Activist can stand alone in an account of memory such as Aristotle’s. For, to put it in a slogan, remembering is an activity involving appearances.

Keywords:   Aristotle, memory, phantasia, imagination, appearances, misremembering, soul, Coriscus

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