Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Fiona Macpherson and Fabian Dorsch

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198717881

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198717881.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 04 June 2020

Justification by Imagination

Justification by Imagination

Chapter:
(p.209) 10 Justification by Imagination
Source:
Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory
Author(s):

Magdalena Balcerak Jackson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198717881.003.0010

The goal of this chapter is to argue that perceptual imaginings are a source of justification. The widespread scepticism about a justificatory role for imaginings stems mainly from the observation that what we imagine, unlike what we perceptually experience, is up to us. This chapter argues that understanding the recreative nature of imaginings provides us with an explanation of why what we imagine is not completely up to us, but is systematically constrained by the general structure of perceptual experience. And, it shows how on this basis imaginings justify us in interesting beliefs about the structure of our perceptual experience and in beliefs about the structure of the world.

Keywords:   imagination, perception, simulation, justification, phenomenal evidence, possibility

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .