This chapter considers a second source of special claims, this time based upon ‘attachment’. Sometimes particular resources matter to people, as non-substitutable supports for their most central life-plans. If so, egalitarians might wrong people if they recommend that we redistribute resources without regard to those attachments. This chapter shows that egalitarianism does not require us to do so. It shows that egalitarians can and should care about these attachments, and moreover that they can be much more permissive towards them than has sometimes been alleged. But pointing towards attachment does not give us reason to believe that some people’s life-plans matter more than others, and it does not give us reason to abandon egalitarianism as a theory about natural resources.
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