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Protecting Animals Within and Across BordersExtraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Challenges of Globalization$

Charlotte E. Blattner

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780190948313

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190948313.001.0001

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Introduction: Protecting Animals in an Age of Globalization

Introduction: Protecting Animals in an Age of Globalization

Chapter:
(p.1) Introduction: Protecting Animals in an Age of Globalization
Source:
Protecting Animals Within and Across Borders
Author(s):

Charlotte E. Blattner

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190948313.003.0001

Abstract and Keywords

In this introduction to Protecting Animals Within and Across Borders, readers are introduced to the topic of extraterritorial animal law and given a roadmap for the book. The chapter explains how animals are bred in one country, slaughtered in another, processed in another, then exported, and that highly mobile multinational corporations systematically exploit weaker animal laws to decrease production costs. Evidence is offered to show that states, policymakers, lawyers, and the public all seek to determine whether and how animals can be protected across borders. The chapter describes the arc of subsequent chapters and their interrelation, making the case that these complex problems can only be solved if they are analyzed from multiple perspectives, including trade, public international, and animal law. The final section outlines the author’s methodology to solve the problems the text raises.

Keywords:   duty to protect, extraterritorial jurisdiction, animal protection, World Trade Organization, WTO

UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, states have a duty to protect their people and anyone within their jurisdiction from human rights violations. The state duty to protect “lies at the very core of the international human rights regime.”1 But does a home state’s responsibility to protect human rights extend beyond its territory? The international community disagrees on the answer to this question. Some scholars argue extending rights beyond a state’s territory opens the door to neocolonialist laws and interventions that are not only unhelpful, but even counterproductive to global justice. Others contend there is an urgent need to acknowledge the many ways human rights abroad are thwarted by home states and to hold those states responsible.2 Regardless of which conclusion the international community reaches, these (p.2) questions, which lie at the heart of contemporary debates in international law, make it difficult to deny that many people now expect states to act responsibly toward individuals and communities situated on foreign soil.

Advocating at this day and age for the protection of animals abroad, by contrast, seems to lie outside the realm of the possible. The way we treat animals is regarded as a domestic matter, subject to each state’s own judgment, and dependent on social attitudes that vary greatly across states and cultures. We also lack a clear commitment by the international community to protect animals,3 something we cannot say about human rights, considering their proliferation after World War II and the adoption of various human rights treaties like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).4 One could argue that despite the absence of a written agreement or declaration, we must take into account the fact that most states have a common conception of behavior respecting animals and of acts committed against animals they deem despicable. In the abstract, this seems to be true, but states differ greatly in their decisions about which animals are worthy of protection and which can be legitimately exploited. These different views have often not been respected or treated as equal before the law. To date, animal law has been appropriated and used to oppress minorities, whether by prohibiting kosher and halal slaughter, live animal markets, horse-tripping, cock-fighting, indigenous hunts, or other practices that do not conform to the hegemonic Western ideal of how animals are “properly used and killed.”5 These contemporary and historical circumstances suggest that protecting animals across the border risks exacerbating existing sociocultural tensions and multiplying their potential to cause conflict across the border.

Yet, declaring extraterritorial jurisdiction a dead end for animal law carries its own risks. Over the last decades, human-animal relationships have become increasingly internationalized. The volume of trade in animals and animal products has exploded, foreign direct investment has been spurring the activity of multinational corporations around the globe, and animal production chains are now dispersed over the territories of many states.6 (p.3) A vast complex of multibillion dollar industries uses animals in sectors including agriculture, research, breeding, and trade in companion animals, creating a dense web of cross-border economic relationships in breeding, cage systems, feed, veterinary practices, technologies, slaughter, packaging, and distribution. The global entanglement of activities that touch on animals has created a situation in which jurisdictional connections can rarely be traced to a single state. In most cases, multiple states share an interest in regulating the very same state of facts when it comes to producing and protecting animals, as evidenced by common newspaper headlines like, “U.N. Court Orders Japan to Halt Whaling,”7 “Indian Border Guards Deployed to Stop Cattle Crossing into Bangladesh,”8 “Europe Strengthens Ban on Seal Products after WTO Challenge,”9 “EU Court: Animal Welfare Rules Apply to Animals Leaving EU,”10 “After Cecil Furor, U.S. Aims to Protect Lions Through Endangered Species Act,”11 “Death at Sea of 4,200 Australian Sheep Prompts New Call for Live Export Bans,”12 “UK and India Call on China to Ban Tiger Farms,”13 or “MEP Call on Bulgarian PM to Ban Stray Dog Euthanasia.”14

These factual and economic entanglements have not made protecting animals an easier task for states, whether the animals they seek to regulate are within or outside their territory. On the contrary, the dense web of socioeconomic activity has accentuated regulatory disparities and led states to compete with each other to attract and retain manufacturers and investors by lowering rather than increasing the protection of animals.15 In this competition, the state with the lowest standard “wins,” and ends up defining the global level of animal protection that will ultimately prevail. The competition in laxity, also known as the race to the bottom, is a common phenomenon in labor law, environmental protection, and human rights law.16 Regulatory economists have not yet weighed in on whether competition in laxity exists in animal law, but there are strong indicators for this economic downward spiral.17 If the predictions about the trajectory of competition in animal law are true, this will have serious consequences for the regulatory authority of states within their own territory, (p.4) undermining their efforts to enact or uphold laws that protect domestic animals. In response to an actual or perceived loss of regulatory power, states committed to protecting animals will be more inclined to use the tools of extraterritorial jurisdiction to undercut competition in laxity in animal law, secure their levels of animal protection, and prevent corporations from forcing them to lax their laws.18

States express their interests in applying animal law extraterritorially mainly in response to public sensitivities to animals, rather than from a sense of legal duty owed to animals. When agricultural businesses systematically outsource or laboratory units move their operations abroad in response to stricter animal protection laws, this has and will likely continue to provoke moral outrage among the public.19 The 2016 Eurobarometer shows that 97 percent of EU citizens today believe that the European Union should do more to raise awareness for animals internationally.20 Because we are witnessing the “globalization of animal cruelty,”21 citizens and governments are now concerned with the status and well-being of animals beyond their borders.22 It is exactly this tension between public demand for better laws for animals and governmental concerns about outsourcing that has brought jurisdictional issues to the forefront of the discussion in animal law.

International law prima facie seems to acknowledge and be responsive to these concerns. The Shrimp/Turtle case23 litigated at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the 1990s made clear that what one state does or permits to be done within its territory can be “of legitimate interest in another state, however distant.”24 In the 2014 Seals case, the WTO acknowledged that the concerns of citizens from one state for the well-being of animals located in the territory of another are worthy of legal protection.25 In the same year, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) led by example in the Whaling in the Antarctic case, demonstrating that international obligations in matters of animal law are adjudged with vigor equivalent to that of any other international obligation.26 This bloom of interest in fields that touch (p.5) on the lives of animals may quickly expand to an unexpected magnitude, including, for example, the entire agricultural sector. In an era of ever-increasing international disputes over jurisdictional competence, when public concerns about animals and their intrinsic needs, desires, and interests have become an issue in world courts and tribunals, animal law solicits our attention from the broader perspective of extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Although animal law has been growing quickly as a field,27 and has taken notice of the many cross-border issues that challenge the core of its achievements, the literature has insufficiently responded to these developments. In the fields of criminal, human rights, environmental, labor, antitrust, securities, and banking law, it is settled that states share an interest in applying national standards extraterritorially and that doing so can be legal under international law.28 But in animal matters, scholars have not yet addressed, much less answered the question of whether cross-border concerns for animals deserve legal protection under international law, notably through extraterritorial jurisdiction. This book takes a broad and inclusive approach to close the most pressing research gaps that unfold at this juncture. I offer a novel and systematic method to define extraterritorial jurisdiction, elucidate the circumstances under which resorting to extraterritorial jurisdiction is justified, and explain how states can succeed at using their jurisdictional powers to protect animals within and across borders without endangering international relations or oppressing minority groups.

Chapter 1 responds to fact that law of jurisdiction is one of the most misunderstood areas of international law, because its rules are derived from the customary practice of states and have rarely been studied and defined in abstracto. The chapter illuminates and clarifies the concept of jurisdiction and its complex relation to extraterritoriality. I begin by explaining the historical and conceptual reasons that led to a recomposition of jurisdictional space on the international level. I then sketch an analytical framework and provide legal evidence that adds nuance and background, creating a comprehensive legal framework that enables us to categorize jurisdictional norms into different, objective elements: their anchor point, their regulated content, and their ancillary effects. To this, I add geographical factors, which help to determine if a matter is territorial, indirect extraterritorial, or direct extraterritorial. Territorial jurisdiction regulates domestic affairs, direct extraterritorial jurisdiction regulates a state of facts abroad, and indirect extraterritorial laws have ancillary effects on foreign territory.29 The framework enables us to (p.6) take a more systematic approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction because it unravels the competing jurisdictional interests of states and decelerates their reciprocal accusations of transgressing each other’s sovereignty. I next apply the framework to animal law, making plain how animal law challenges the moda operandi of the law of jurisdiction and how states could prima facie devise their laws to protect animals abroad. Because the law of jurisdiction can be rather technical, I use four case groups to make the topic more approachable. The case groups represent the breadth of the issues that currently preoccupy international relations, including the exploitation of weak animal laws abroad by corporations (e.g., by outsourcing production), the question of trade liberalization and trade restrictions, animal migration, and the exploitation of weak standards abroad by individuals (e.g., through trophy hunting or bestiality).

Scholars frequently raise the concern that applying animal law across the border can be an illegitimate way to influence the organization of other states, which amounts to a paradigmatic form of neocolonialism. Chapter 2 responds to these concerns by positing the extraterritorial protection of animals as an increasingly accepted practice in international law. Extraterritorial jurisdiction traditionally prevails in fields of law that regulate economic matters, like antitrust, stock exchange, and securities law, because global entanglement of finances and assets warrant transborder regulation. Extraterritorial jurisdiction also dominates the criminal law discourse, to the extent that states share a core concern about and condemnation of the most repulsive crimes. I examine whether the rationale of economic entanglement and the rationale of a common consensus also exist in animal law and if states have a shared interest in using their laws to protect animals more effectively across borders. If both conditions are met, there is a good chance that cross-border animal laws will proliferate in the future and will increasingly be regarded as legitimate by the international community.

Chapters 3 to 7 explore the options states have under international law to apply their laws to animals in foreign countries. Chapters 3 and 4 study indirect options for protecting animals under the laws of the WTO. Academic contributions at the intersection of trade law and animal law have significantly proliferated after the Appellate Body’s (AB) report in the 2014 Seals case,30 but they tend to settle for examining the general conflict between trade liberalization and animal law. Chapter 3 advances the discussion and fills a gap in legal scholarship by examining whether and how states can use trade law to indirectly protect animals abroad through, for instance, import prohibitions, taxes and tariffs, or labels. I ask if trade-restrictive measures that indirectly protect foreign animals are legal under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),31 and then turn to justifications for potential violations of the agreement. In Chapter 4, I examine the extraterritorial reach of agreements typically neglected in the literature on animals in trade law, namely, of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),32 the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and (p.7) Phytosanitary Measures (SPS),33 the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA),34 the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA),35 and the Special Treatment Clause.36 As case reports show, these agreements increasingly play a role in litigation, so studying them gives us a more comprehensive picture of indirect extraterritoriality, particularly as regards labels, standards, measures aimed at eliminating food- and pest-borne risks, dumping, and special treatment for majority world countries.

Chapter 5 answers a question that scholars have not asked before: Can jurisdictional principles under general international law be used to directly protect animals abroad? In this lex lata analysis, I explore how and to what extent states can invoke the general territoriality principle, the subjective and objective territoriality principles, the personality principle, and the protective principle in the realm of animal law. These analyses grapple with several problematic issues like cross-border offenses (e.g., violation of transportation standards or cross-border duties of care), prescribing behavior of nationals abroad (including multinational enterprises), and practices of foreign agricultural industries that significantly pollute the environment across borders.

In addition to indirect and direct extraterritorial jurisdiction, states can use a broader form of extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect animals across borders, which I call “extended extraterritorial jurisdiction.” These subtler forms of extraterritorial regulation are fully established in human rights law and comprise foreign policy rules, investment agreements, jurisdiction assigned to international bodies, and forms of self-regulation by private actors. Chapter 6 explores the use of these instruments for states that want to protect animals abroad, and focuses on investment rules, export credit standards, bilateral investment treaties, bilateral free trade agreements, impact assessments, reporting, corporate social responsibility, codes of conduct, and the Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, issued by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).37

Because extraterritorial animal law is novel and challenges the standard operability of the law of jurisdiction, Chapter 7 develops a set of lex ferenda options for states to protect animals more effectively across the border. Taking a critical positivist approach, I argue that animals ought to have functional nationality, like ships and corporations, that establishes a jurisdictional link to their home state. By treating animals as nationals, the home state has the power to use the passive personality principle to broadly protect them abroad. I then turn to whether the universality principle can be used to prohibit the most egregious crimes against animals, wherever they are committed and by whomever. This principle may allow states to extend their laws to, for instance, animals trafficked and exposed to organized crime that escapes the jurisdiction of all states (such as illegal wildlife trafficking). I also analyze current (p.8) arguments for a noneconomic version of the effects principle that justifies the use of extraterritorial laws to prevent or penalize actions that damage a state’s reputation.

Next, I offer an overarching analysis of options available to protect animals across the border within the extraterritoriality framework. Using this broader perspective, I can begin to describe trends in the law of jurisdiction, including the types of jurisdiction the international community is most likely to accept. I return to the four case groups and introduce them to the extraterritoriality framework, demonstrating how states could manifest their jurisdiction in these cases, which helps us test and adapt the results obtained earlier.

A study of extraterritorial jurisdiction in animal law may comfortably stop at this point, as do most legal inquiries after they mapped states’ options under the law of jurisdiction. But in animal law, states lack guidance on how to meaningfully connect this young but growing field to their jurisdictional powers. Chapters 8 to 10 describe the contours of this connection. A central question Chapter 8 raises and answers whether states can use extraterritorial jurisdiction only to protect animals abroad, or whether they can also rely on this concept to lower animal laws, for example, as a side effect to lucrative trade deals. I analyze the moral direction of extraterritorial animal laws from three perspectives: general international law (including considerations of global justice and the precautionary principle), trade law, and animal law. All three perspectives converge on the idea that states cannot apply animal norms extraterritorially if these laws are detrimental to animals.

Since these results do not tell us how consistently states must protect animals, I turn to this question next. I establish a hierarchy of presumptions to guide public authorities and help them decide which animal laws meet the basic parameters of beneficence and consistency. The hierarchy includes presumptions in favor of transparency in animal law, recognizing animal interests, integrating animal interests, detailed standards, adequately balancing interests, prohibitions, and animal rights. I then explore whether we can look to human rights law for guidance on the content of extraterritorial animal law, in particular by drawing on the United Nations’ (UN) “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework.38 The framework promises to shed light on the questions of whether states have a duty to protect animals across the border, and whether corporations operating abroad are bound to respect the interests of animals.

In focusing on the content of extraterritorial animal law, another set of critical questions must be answered. Chapter 9 asks if all criminal, administrative, and civil standards can be employed extraterritorially, and compares the benefits of applying each of them across the border. I illustrate the benefits of constitutional animal law, including constitutional state objectives to protect animals, constitutional rights and prohibitions, and duties of compassion. I also demonstrate the benefits we can anticipate by using criminal animal law (including advanced rules on corporate liability) and administrative animal law (including standards on keeping, transporting, and slaughtering) to protect animals across borders. I end with exemplary models and achievements that could guide the law of jurisdiction in the future.

Since the belief that it is valuable and necessary to protect animals across the border does not answer the legality of extraterritorial animal law under international law, I tackle (p.9) the issue of legality in Chapter 10. I describe the types of jurisdictional conflicts that could emerge in animal law and explain the strategies states can use to unilaterally manage, prevent, and mitigate them, by respecting the principle of the rule of law, the prohibition of double jeopardy, and the principle of reasonableness. When the jurisdictional interests of two or more states in protecting animals abroad conflict, I offer guidance to help resolve conflicts by means of the principle of comity and bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Another central task of Chapter 10 is to describe the circumstances in which states prescribing law across the border violate international law and the consequences of their breach. I approach this delicate topic by analyzing the scope of the principles of sovereign equality, nonintervention, territorial integrity, and self-determination of peoples. Gaining knowledge about these limits is essential for states to assess the legal risks involved in passing extraterritorial animal laws. But are those legal limits strong enough to ensure animal laws are not applied in an imperialist manner across the border or targeting ethnic and cultural minorities? My analysis suggests that existing limits are not sufficient to remove concerns about neocolonialism and new forms of discrimination. Given these dangers, and because there is a strong need for the law of jurisdiction to grow beyond its tainted renomée, I discuss useful precautions advanced by scholars who specialize in posthuman and postcolonialist studies.

The broader limits of the law of jurisdiction drawn in this chapter are picked up in more detail in Chapter 11. I here return to the structural challenges of animal law in an era of globalization and multiculturalism and take a broader, multidisciplinary approach to determine whether extraterritorial jurisdiction can help tackle them. Though many challenges exist, I here focus on three obstacles that deserve our full attention. First, I turn to whether the law of jurisdiction truly has the potential to bolster domestic efforts to protect animals, or whether it simply creates confusion and chaos. Second, I ask if there are benefits to using laws to protect animals across the border when states’ laws are only marginally better than those of their neighboring states. This brings me to the third concern, namely, the social and societal risks (as opposed to legal risks) we take when adopting this strategy, in particular the risk of exacerbating power hierarchies and sweeping forms of oppression associated with them. These concerns pose a real challenge to the law of jurisdiction and demand that we do not blindly advocate the blanket use of the extraterritorial jurisdiction. At the same time, we cannot afford to ignore the need to protect animals across the border, as this would succumb them to economic laissez-faire. I end by offering ideas about complementary measures we must take to ensure extraterritorial animal law will fill regulatory gaps, and discuss how animal law must change before it can be usefully and meaningfully applied across borders. In the last section, I show how extraterritorial animal law can break away from its aversion to multiculturalism and become a conduit for cross-cultural sensibility, by raising awareness of shared histories and offering opposition to oppression.

Throughout the book, I use the international law method to identify, analyze, and interpret sources of international law, based on article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) (international conventions, customary international law, and general principles of law recognized by nations).39 The principal source used to determine extraterritorial jurisdiction in animal matters would ideally be international treaty law, but so far, (p.10) states have neither concluded a treaty on this particular subject (jurisdiction over animals involving cross-border relations), nor have they established an international convention on prescriptive jurisdiction in general. Trade law is by and large the only realm in which treaties have been concluded, and these will inform my analysis of jurisdiction to indirectly protect animals. As my focus lies on developing direct means to protect animals more effectively at home and abroad, the main source I use throughout this book are norms of customary international law pursuant to article 38 para. I lit. b of the ICJ Statute. Determining if a norm is sufficiently practiced and accepted as law among states to constitute a binding international custom can be difficult because we must examine and interpret a whole range of administrative acts, domestic legislation (including constitutions, statutes, regulations, communications, and case law), and unilateral state acts.40 General principles of international law serve as a complementary means to determine the applicable law (article 38 para. I lit. c ICJ Statute). These principles constitute wide-ranging, unwritten municipal norms that states can transpose to the international level.41 Judicial decisions (including precedents, arbitral tribunal decisions, and international decisions) and scholarly works, pursuant to article 38 para. I lit. d of the ICJ Statute, are the secondary means by which I determine international norms. Among these are also authoritative statements like the Restatement of the United States,42 guidelines of respected international organizations like the UN,43 and representative codes of conduct by multinational enterprises. I use hermeneutic methods based on articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) to interpret international norms.44 When interpreting principles, I rely on a doctrinal and systematic analysis of international law. And when I identify animal laws and analyze them in a comparative way, I use a functional comparative method that identifies relevant similarities and differences between jurisdictions.45

Notes:

(1) U.N. Human Rights Council, 8th Sess., Special Representative of the Secretary-General John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5, para. 9 (Apr. 7, 2008) [Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework].

(2) See further Karen da Costa, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SELECTED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2013); Olivier de Schutter, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AS A TOOL FOR IMPROVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (Business and Human Rights Resource Center 2006); Marko Milanovic, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011); Malcolm Langford ET AL. EDS., GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES (2013); Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law, 70 MOD. L. REV. 598 (2007); ESCR-Net, GLOBAL ECONOMY, GLOBAL RIGHTS, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE FOR INTERPRETING HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2014); Jennifer A. Zerk, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: LESSONS FOR THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS SPHERE FROM SIX REGULATORY AREAS (Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 59, Harvard University 2010).

(3) On the international level, there is no treaty in force that expresses a uniform commitment of states to recognize animal sentience, prohibit cruelty toward animals, prevent suffering, demand humane treatment, lay down robust rights for animals, or the like. This gap is also noted by Peggy Cunniff & Marcia Kramer, Developments in Animal Law, in THE GLOBAL GUIDE TO ANIMAL PROTECTION 230 (Andrew Linzey ed., 2013); David Favre, An International Treaty for Animal Welfare, in ANIMAL LAW AND WELFARE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 87, 92 (Deborah Cao & Steven White eds., 2016); Anne Peters, Global Animal Law: What It Is and Why We Need It, 5 TEL 9, 13 (2016).

(4) G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR 3rd Sess., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/RES/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [UDHR].

(5) For critical analyses, see, e.g., Maneesha Deckha, Animal Justice, Cultural Justice: A Posthumanist Response to Cultural Rights in Animals, 2 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 189 (2007); Claire Jean Kim, DANGEROUS CROSSINGS: RACE, SPECIES, AND NATURE IN A MULTICULTURAL AGE 4 (2015); Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson, Animal Rights, Multiculturalism, and the Left, 45(1) J. SOC. PHIL. 116, 126 (2014).

(6) For example, between 1986 and 2016, trade in eggs, meat, and dairy increased threefold. In this period, the increase in “fresh” products (excluding frozen, condensed, evaporated, prepared, or dried products) was astonishing: egg trade increased from 748,241 to 2,107,373 tons, meat trade increased from 17,814,372 to 71,877,429 tons, and trade in milk increased from 6,266,492 to 18,587,86 tons: FAOSTAT (search criteria“Eggs”+“Milk”+“Meat”+“Export Quantity”+“World”+“1986, 2016”), available at http://faostat.fao.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).

(7) Hiroko Tabuchi & Marlise Simons, U.N. Court Orders Japan to Halt Whaling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2014.

(8) David Millward, Indian Border Guards Deployed to Stop Cattle Crossing into Bangladesh, THE TELEGRAPH, July 4, 2015.

(9) Arthur Neslen, Europe Strengthens Ban on Seal Products after WTO Challenge, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 8, 2015.

(10) Charles Siebert, EU Court: Animal Welfare Rules Apply to Animals Leaving EU, BBC NEWS, Apr. 23, 2015.

(11) Erica Goode, After Cecil Furor, U.S. Aims to Protect Lions Through Endangered Species Act, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2015.

(12) Daniel Hurst, Death at Sea of 4,200 Australian Sheep Prompts New Call for Live Export Bans, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 17, 2014.

(13) Gaia Vince, UK and India Call on China to Ban Tiger Farms, THE GUARDIAN, July 26, 2012.

(14) MEP Call on Bulgarian PM to Ban Stray Dog Euthanasia, NOVINITE, May 20, 2012.

(15) Deregulation is only one of four factors that can account for competition in laxity: Dale D. Murphy, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 7 (2004).

(16) Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Global Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 407, 414 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 2010).

(17) The existence of competition in laxity in animal law is studied in detail in Chapter 2, §3.

(18) Barbara Gabor, REGULATORY COMPETITION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET: COMPARING MODELS OF CORPORATE LAW, SECURITIES LAW AND COMPETITION LAW 3 (2013).

(19) E.g., Jill Laster, Plan to Breed Lab Monkey Splits Puerto Rican Town, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 30, 2009.

(20) European Commission, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 442 REPORT: ATTITUDES OF EUROPEANS TOWARDS ANIMAL WELFARE 11 (2016).

(21) Steven White & Deborah Cao, Introduction: Animal Protection in an Interconnected World, in ANIMAL LAW AND WELFARE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 2 (2016).

(22) Miyun Park & Peter Singer, The Globalization of Animal Welfare: More Food Does Not Require More Suffering, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 122 (2012).

(23) Appellate Body Report, US—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) [Shrimp/Turtle I, AB Report].

(24) Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 527, 537 ff. (2000).

(25) Panel Report, EC—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/R, WT/DS4001/R (adopted June 18, 2014) [Seals, Panel Report]. Affirmed in Appellate Body in Appellate Body Report, EC—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS4001/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014) [Seals, AB Report].

(26) Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. Intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 2014 (Mar. 31) [Whaling in the Antarctic, 2014 I.C.J.]. The International Whaling Commission (IWC), though originally commissioned to ensure a stable stock of whales for continuous hunting, is now considering the welfare of whales in fringe meetings and subgroup meetings: David Broom, International Animal Welfare Perspectives, Including Whaling and Inhumane Seal Killing as a W.T.O. Public Morality Issue, in ANIMAL LAW AND WELFARE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 55 (2016). In December 2018, Yoshihide Suga, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, announced that the country will leave the IWC, after the organization put in place a global ban on all commercial whaling: Daniel Victor, Japan to Resume Commercial Whaling, Defying International Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2018.

(27) Animal law is taught at nine universities in Australia, seven universities in Canada, one university in China, two universities in Israel, three universities in New Zealand, one university in Spain, six universities in the United Kingdom, and 167 law schools in the United States: Animal Legal Defense Fund, Animal Law Courses, available at http://aldf.org/animal-law-courses/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).

(28) See for a general overview, Cedric Ryngaert, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2015); Joanne Scott, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62 AJCL 87 (2014); Zerk, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION (2010).

(29) This third type is sometimes also called intraterritorial regulation with extraterritorial effect: Werner Meng, EXTRATERRITORIALE JURISDIKTION IM ÖFFENTLICHEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 11 (1994); Anne Peters, VÖLKERRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL 148–9 (4th ed. 2016).

(30) See supra note 25.

(31) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [GATT].

(32) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [TBT].

(33) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [SPS].

(34) Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [Anti-Dumping Agreement, ADA].

(35) Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 [AoA].

(36) WTO, Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Decision of 28 November 1979, L/4903, Dec. 3, 1979.

(37) ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES (OECD Publishing, Paris 2011).

(38) See the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework.

(39) Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [ICJ Statute].

(40) States’ stance toward the topic is expressed through physical and verbal acts of their legislative, judicial, and executive organs: International Bar Association (IBA), REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 18 (IBA, London 2009).

(41) Alain Pellet, Art. 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 731, 741 ff. (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).

(42) American Law Institute, Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (2018) [U.S. Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law].

(43) E.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, 17th Sess., Special Representative of the Secretary-General John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights]; OECD, GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011).

(44) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, arts. 31 and 32 [VCLT].

(45) This method is primarily used and discussed in Chapter 9.