Canonical histories of logic tend to presuppose a narrow notion of “formal logic” and discount early modern works on logic as uninteresting and unoriginal. More sympathetic historians typically respond by noting that early modern philosophers worked with an exceptionally broad notion of “logic,” which involved subjects that we now treat separately in such disciplines as epistemology, metaphysics, and psychology. Without pitting these approaches against each other, this book distinguishes “logic” and “philosophy of logic.” The latter concerns questions about logic that should be of perennial interest to philosophers, if not necessarily to today’s logicians. These include questions about the status of logic as a “science,” its relation to reality, the nature of its laws, and so on and so forth. Such questions will be the focus throughout the book.
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