Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Fixing Democracy – How Power Asymmetries Help Explain Presidential Powers in New Constitutions, Evidence from Latin America | Oxford Scholarship Online
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Fixing Democracy: How Power Asymmetries Help Explain Presidential Powers in New Constitutions, Evidence from Latin America

Javier Corrales

Abstract

This book explores the origins of presidential powers in new constitutions. Much is known about the effects of different presidential powers—less on the conditions that lead to their emergence. The book focuses on the origins of these powers. It argues that the most important predictor of whether a new constitution will expand (instead of restrict) presidential powers is power asymmetry, or more specifically, the difference in power assets between the Incumbent and the Opposition. These power assets can include electoral results, seats at key institutions such as the negotiating table, and eve ... More

Keywords: democratization, constitution, power asymmetry, presidential power, populism, checks and balances, Latin America, politics, election, representation, approval ratings, term limits

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780190868895
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2018 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190868895.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Javier Corrales, author
Professor of Political Science, Amherst College

Show Summary Details

subscribe or login to access all content.

Contents

View:

Part I The Argument

Part II Explaining Constituent Assemblies and Presidential Powers

Part III Case Studies

Part IV Power Asymmetry and Self-Dealing

Part V Conclusion

End Matter