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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality | Oxford Scholarship Online
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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Angela Mendelovici


Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in-principle difficulties with currently popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of trac ... More

Keywords: intentionality, mental representation, consciousness, experience, phenomenal intentionality, tracking theory, conceptual role semantics, internalism about mental content, thought, perception

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780190863807
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2018 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001


Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Angela Mendelovici, author
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Western University