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What It Is Like To PerceiveDirect Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception$
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J. Christopher Maloney

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780190854751

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190854751.001.0001

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Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content

Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content

Chapter:
(p.58) Chapter 4 Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content
Source:
What It Is Like To Perceive
Author(s):

J. Christopher Maloney

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190854751.003.0004

Defending intentionalism, some argue that perceptual content is idiosyncratically nonconceptual: conceptually innocent; defiant of verbalization; or too richly fine-grained for subsumption under concepts carrying ratiocination. No: perception is conceptual in a manner that fits the cognitive capacities of perceivers generally. If perception is subservient to attention, a speaker's perceptual content admits of relatively simple reports implying rudimentary conceptualization. Perception's content is neither too rich nor fine-grained for expression or conceptualization. Intentionalism's temptation towards the contrary be may be urged by memory’s misguided tendency towards constructive confabulation. So, perceptual content may be neither so rich, dense, nor determinate as post-perceptual consideration and testimony may suggest. Finally, Sperling’s early important empirical work on perceptual memory cuts against intentionalism's conjecture of perception's nonconceptual content. Sperling discovered that perceptual memory can completely rehearse its recollected content. Accordingly, but contrary to intentionalism, memory might echo perception's content yet shed its phenomenal character.

Keywords:   Key words: attention, conceptual content, intentionalism, memory, nonconceptual content, cognition, rich content, Sperling

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