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Can Animals Be Persons?$
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Mark Rowlands

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780190846039

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190846039.001.0001

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Self-Awareness and Persons

Self-Awareness and Persons

Chapter:
(p.165) 9 Self-Awareness and Persons
Source:
Can Animals Be Persons?
Author(s):

Mark Rowlands

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0009

Since there are two forms of self-awareness, there is question concerning which is relevant, or most relevant, in the formation of the person. The relevance of self-awareness in the formation of the person consists in the role it plays in underwriting the unity of a mental life. Intentional self-awareness is incapable of doing this. Appeal to the apparatus of intentional act and object presupposes the unity of a mental life and, therefore, cannot explain it. Pre-intentional self-awareness is much more promising as a candidate for underwriting the unity of a mental life. The identity of the person is imprinted on the content of each mental act of which he is pre-intentionally aware. Thus, to whom the act belongs is part of the content of the mental act. This can explain the unity of a mental life.

Keywords:   content, intentional self-awareness, persons, pre-intentional self-awareness, unity of the self

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