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Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for GodThe Plantinga Project$
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Jerry L. Walls and Trent Dougherty

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780190842215

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190842215.001.0001

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The Argument from (Natural) Numbers

The Argument from (Natural) Numbers

Chapter:
(C) The Argument from (Natural) Numbers
Source:
Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God
Author(s):

Tyron Goldschmidt

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190842215.003.0004

This chapter considers Plantinga’s argument from numbers for the existence of God. Plantinga sees divine psychologism as having advantages over both human psychologism and Platonism. The chapter begins with Plantinga’s description of the argument, including the relation of numbers to any divine attribute. It then argues that human psychologism can be ruled out completely. However, what rules it out might rule out divine psychologism too. It also argues that the main problem with Platonism might also be a problem with divine psychologism. However, it will, at the least, be less of a problem. In any case, there are alternative, possibly viable views about the nature of numbers that have not been touched by Plantinga’s argument. In addition, the chapter touches on the argument from properties, and its relation to the argument from numbers.

Keywords:   God, numbers, Plantinga, Platonism, psychologism

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