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Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for GodThe Plantinga Project$
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Jerry L. Walls and Trent Dougherty

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780190842215

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190842215.001.0001

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The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus

The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus

Arguments from Knowledge, Reference, and Content

Chapter:
(N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus
Source:
Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God
Author(s):

Daniel Bonevac

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190842215.003.0014

This chapter examines three of Alvin Plantinga’s arguments for the existence of God: the Putnamian argument (or the argument from global skepticism), the argument from reference, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein argument from plus and quus. They begin with skeptical arguments against the possibility of knowledge, reference, or content and convert them into arguments for God’s existence. The key idea behind these arguments is that content and the knowledge of it are infinitary and normative. These features of content make it impossible to account for a speaker’s content, since a finite being’s dispositions are finite. Content requires a non-naturalistic relation to an infinite set of finite minds or to an infinite mind. The only options for accounting for content are pragmatism and theism. If pragmatism fails, then theism is the only remaining option.

Keywords:   Putnam, Kripke, Wittgenstein, argument from reference, argument from content, argument from knowledge, plus and quus, pragmatism, theism

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