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The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973The USSR's Military Intervention  in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict$
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Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780190693480

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190693480.001.0001

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The Deal at the Summit and the “Expulsion” Myth

The Deal at the Summit and the “Expulsion” Myth

Chapter:
(p.263) 23 The Deal at the Summit and the “Expulsion” Myth
Source:
The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973
Author(s):

Isabella Ginor

Gideon Remez

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0023

At the Moscow Summit of May 1972, the Middle Eastern issue was the last obstacle to be overcome for completion of a broad declaration of principles for détente. Subsequently accessible documentation disproves the assertion that US statesman Henry Kissinger inculcated by early publication of his memoirs, whereby the summit ended with an anodyne statement on this contentious issue that was understood by Egypt as abandonment by its superpower patron. Actually, in order to ensure other aspects of his global détente policy, Kissinger secured the withdrawal of Soviet regulars (but not of advisers, as both Egyptian President Sadat and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had stipulated) in return for considerable concessions on the terms of an Egyptian-Israeli settlement – which were kept secret for US political considerations and not communicated to Israel. The resulting announcement by Sadat on 18 July that the Soviets’ mission in Egypt was ending had to be camouflaged as an expulsion of advisers due to a fictitious Egyptian-Soviet rift because of Moscow’s refusal, as part of détente, to provide offensive weapons.

Keywords:   Moscow Summit, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Leonid Brezhnev, Henry Kissinger, Vladimir Vinogradov, SAM-3, MiG-21, Egypt, USSR, United States

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