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The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973The USSR's Military Intervention  in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict$
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Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780190693480

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190693480.001.0001

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SAM Successes and a Mig Debacle

SAM Successes and a Mig Debacle

(p.189) 16 SAM Successes and a Mig Debacle
The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973

Isabella Ginor

Gideon Remez

Oxford University Press

Despite its considerable losses in the 18 July engagement, the Soviet SAM array’s success against Israel’s US-supplied planes and technology bolstered confidence in Egypt and the USSR that the Israelis could not prevent advance of the missile shield to the Suez Canal bank – a precondition for the future cross-canal offensive. Nasser, with Soviet backing, accepted Rogers; proposal of a ceasefire. Among Soviet forces, the MiG pilots’ envy of the missilemen led them to initiate combat but then into an Israeli trap on 30 July, when five Soviet planes were shot down in a dogfight for no Israeli losses. This enabled Israel too to accept the ceasefire without loss of face, though it was actually imposed on the Israelis by continuing, unsustainable losses of aircraft and especially irreplaceable crews to the Soviet SAMs.

Keywords:   Operation Kavkaz, SAM-3, F-4 Phantom, Soviet Air Defense Corps, Israel Air Force, Gamal Abdel Nasser, William Rogers

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