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Andy Clark and His Critics$
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Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvine, and Mog Stapleton

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780190662813

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190662813.001.0001

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Extended Mental Features

Extended Mental Features

Chapter:
(p.44) 4 Extended Mental Features
Source:
Andy Clark and His Critics
Author(s):

Katalin Farkas

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190662813.003.0005

The focus of the original argument for the Extended Mind thesis was the case of beliefs. It may be asked what other types of mental features can be extended. Andy Clark has always held that consciousness cannot be extended. This chapter revisits the question of extending consciousness.

Keywords:   extended mind, extended cognition, functionalism, consciousness, perception

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