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Andy Clark and His Critics$
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Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvine, and Mog Stapleton

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780190662813

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190662813.001.0001

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The Elusive Extended Mind

The Elusive Extended Mind

Extended Information Processing Doesn’t Equal Extended Mind

Chapter:
(p.21) 2 The Elusive Extended Mind
Source:
Andy Clark and His Critics
Author(s):

Fred Adams

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190662813.003.0003

For nearly twenty years Andy Clark has been the chief architect and proponent of the thesis of extended mind. But it is only the cognitive processes in the mind that extend, according to Clark (not consciousness itself). However, when it comes to saying what a cognitive process is such that one can determine whether it does or does not extend, Clark is less forthcoming. He has offered a Dennettian “cognition is as cognition does.” He has offered that cognition is “what supports intelligent behavior.” In some cases he comes very close to asserting that we don’t really need to say what cognition is. This chapter explains why this all matters and why the failure to be more forthcoming makes the extended mind an elusive entity.

Keywords:   cognitive kind, cognitive process, coupling-constitution fallacy, information, perception-action loop, parity principle, nonderived content, supervenience

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