Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Andy Clark and His Critics$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvine, and Mog Stapleton

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780190662813

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190662813.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 08 December 2019

Extended Cognition and Extended Consciousness

Extended Cognition and Extended Consciousness

Chapter:
(p.9) 1 Extended Cognition and Extended Consciousness
Source:
Andy Clark and His Critics
Author(s):

David J. Chalmers

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190662813.003.0002

Chapter 1 discusses two questions about the extended mind. First, what is the extended mind thesis? Second, can there be extended consciousness, and if not, why not? The chapter answers the first question by arguing that the thesis should be formulated in terms of perception and action: a subject’s cognitive processes and mental states can be partly constituted by entities that are external to the subject, in virtue of the subject’s interacting with these entities via perception and action. The second question is answered by appealing to direct availability for global control as the physical correlate of consciousness: extended processes always involve indirect availability for global control, mediated by perception and action, so there is no extended consciousness.

Keywords:   extended mind, externalism, perception, action, availability

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .