Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Moral Punishment Instinct$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jan-Willem van Prooijen

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780190609979

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190609979.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 October 2019

Punishment and Cooperation

Punishment and Cooperation

Chapter:
(p.125) 5 Punishment and Cooperation
Source:
The Moral Punishment Instinct
Author(s):

Jan-Willem van Prooijen

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190609979.003.0005

One of the core assumptions of the proposition that moral punishment is an instinct is that punishment stimulates cooperation among group members. This chapter starts with supernatural punishment, illuminating that whereas belief in heaven has no effect on national crime rates, belief in hell reduces crime rates. Also, in economic games, the possibility to punish increases the cooperation that people display. These effects emerge because punishment increases deterrence, communicates moral norms, and instills trust. The chapter then notes that punishment has facilitated cooperation among strangers as people started forming large states, and that people become more punitive in situations that required unconditional cooperation and self-sacrifice for the group (i.e., war). These findings suggest that punishment indeed stimulates cooperation in social groups.

Keywords:   Supernatural punishment, social dilemma, economic game, cooperation, deterrence, moral norms, trust, large states, war

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .