- Title Pages
- About the Editors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
- 1 United States—Deconstructing the FCPA
- 2 Australia
- 3 Brazil
- 4 Canada
- 5 China
- 6 Cuba
- 7 France
- 8 Germany
- 9 Guatemala
- 10 India
- 11 Indonesia
- 12 Mexico
- 13 Russia
- 14 South Africa
- 15 Tunisia
- 16 The United Arab Emirates
- 17 United Kingdom
- 18 “Carbon-Copy Prosecutions”: A Multi-Dimensional Enforcement Paradigm that is Here to Stay
- 19 The Delicate Task: Guide to Investigating Allegations of Company-Internal Misconduct
- 20 The Key Tools of the Trade in Transnational Bribery Investigations and Prosecutions: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and Letters Rogatory
- 21 Global Developments in, and Evolution of, Third-Party Due Diligence
- 22 Investigations, Privacy and Data Security Issues
- 23 Increasing Accountability and Reducing Corruption: the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption System
- 24 Corporate Monitors and the Monitorship Process
- 25 Voluntary Disclosures
- 26 Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Nonprosecution Agreements, and Corporate Integrity Agreements
- 27 Company Cooperation and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
- 28 Department of Justice’s New Revised FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy
- 29 On the Anti-Bribery “Watchlist”: Compliance and Labor/Anti-Trafficking Issues
- Conclusion
- Appendix A The 2018 TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix
- Appendix B 9-47.000—Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
- Index
“Carbon-Copy Prosecutions”: A Multi-Dimensional Enforcement Paradigm that is Here to Stay
“Carbon-Copy Prosecutions”: A Multi-Dimensional Enforcement Paradigm that is Here to Stay
- Chapter:
- (p.495) 18 “Carbon-Copy Prosecutions”: A Multi-Dimensional Enforcement Paradigm that is Here to Stay
- Source:
- From Baksheesh to Bribery
- Author(s):
Andrew Boutros
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
One emerging transnational trend in anti-corruption efforts is the phenomenon of “carbon-copy prosecutions”: when foreign or domestic Jurisdiction A files charges based on a guilty plea or charging document from Jurisdiction B. The net effect of DOJ and SEC FCPA settlement policies is that when a company enters into a negotiated resolution with U.S. enforcers, it is essentially powerless to defend against—much less deny—the factual basis on which the resolution is based. This all but ensures that a company that settles with the DOJ—or both the DOJ and SEC in parallel proceedings—will have little or no choice but to settle with U.S. and foreign authorities, should such authorities choose to exercise jurisdiction and enforce their corollary anti-corruption laws. Duplicative serial enforcement actions are now part and parcel of the enforcement landscape, despite a healthy ongoing debate over the need for, and fairness of, serial enforcements.
Keywords: carbon-copy prosecution, serial enforcement, anti-corruption, FCPA, bribe, corruption
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- Title Pages
- About the Editors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
- 1 United States—Deconstructing the FCPA
- 2 Australia
- 3 Brazil
- 4 Canada
- 5 China
- 6 Cuba
- 7 France
- 8 Germany
- 9 Guatemala
- 10 India
- 11 Indonesia
- 12 Mexico
- 13 Russia
- 14 South Africa
- 15 Tunisia
- 16 The United Arab Emirates
- 17 United Kingdom
- 18 “Carbon-Copy Prosecutions”: A Multi-Dimensional Enforcement Paradigm that is Here to Stay
- 19 The Delicate Task: Guide to Investigating Allegations of Company-Internal Misconduct
- 20 The Key Tools of the Trade in Transnational Bribery Investigations and Prosecutions: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and Letters Rogatory
- 21 Global Developments in, and Evolution of, Third-Party Due Diligence
- 22 Investigations, Privacy and Data Security Issues
- 23 Increasing Accountability and Reducing Corruption: the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption System
- 24 Corporate Monitors and the Monitorship Process
- 25 Voluntary Disclosures
- 26 Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Nonprosecution Agreements, and Corporate Integrity Agreements
- 27 Company Cooperation and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
- 28 Department of Justice’s New Revised FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy
- 29 On the Anti-Bribery “Watchlist”: Compliance and Labor/Anti-Trafficking Issues
- Conclusion
- Appendix A The 2018 TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix
- Appendix B 9-47.000—Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
- Index