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Hiring and Firing Public OfficialsRethinking the Purpose of Elections$
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Justin Buchler

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199759972

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199759972.001.0001

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Elections as Employment Mechanisms

Elections as Employment Mechanisms

(p.59) Chapter 3 Elections as Employment Mechanisms
Hiring and Firing Public Officials

Justin Buchler

Oxford University Press

This chapter presents a new conceptual model for electoral theory based on employment. It argues that voters should be thought of as employers, candidates as job applicants, and elected officials as employees. The electoral process, then, is merely a hiring and firing mechanism. It then derives some normative principles of elections in a democracy that follow from the employment paradigm.

Keywords:   electoral theory, employment, voters, employers, political candidates, elected officials, electoral process, hiring, firing, democracy

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