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Thinking the ImpossibleFrench Philosophy Since 1960$
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Gary Gutting

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199227037

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199227037.001.0001

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Conclusion

Conclusion

Thinking the Impossible

Chapter:
(p.184) 10 Conclusion
Source:
Thinking the Impossible
Author(s):

Gary Gutting

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199227037.003.0011

While analytic philosophy claims that everything is subject to conceptual understanding, French philosophers are interested in that which cannot be conceived and therefore in attempting to grasp the unthinkable. There lays a disparity between absolute scepticism (Levinas, Derrida, Marion) and relative scepticism (Foucault, Deleuze, Badiou) regarding the notion of conceptual impossibilities. Nevertheless, this chapter argues that new concepts pertaining to the understanding of such impossibilities are always attainable. It also addresses some of the problems within the theories presented in the book, beginning with Derrida's deconstructions, Marion's divine incomprehensibility, and Deleuze's concept of repetition.

Keywords:   French philosophy, analytic philosophy, conceptual understanding, absolute scepticism, relative scepticism, conceptual impossibilities, deconstruction, divine incomprehensibility, concept of repetition

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