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Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds$
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Daniel Friedman and Barry Sinervo

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780199981151

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199981151.001.0001

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Simple Frequency Dependence

Simple Frequency Dependence

Chapter:
(p.33) 2 Simple Frequency Dependence
Source:
Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds
Author(s):

Daniel Friedman

Barry Sinervo

Daniel Friedman

Barry Sinervo

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199981151.003.0002

This chapter takes a first look at strategic interdependence, known to biologists as frequency dependent selection. It distinguishes positive interaction effects (increasing returns or synergy) from negative effects (e.g., congestion). The chapter introduces Maynard Smith’s famous Hawk‐Dove game, and goes on to show that there are only two other generic types of 2 × 2 games: dominant strategy (DS), illustrated with biological data on RNA viruses and economic examples drawn from eBay; and coordination (CO) games. Conditions for the prisoner’s dilemma are defined. The remaining sections show how these games represent edges of the state space in games with three alternative strategies. This includes data on male side‐blotched lizards that shows they play the true rock‐paper‐scissors: each edge game has a different dominant strategy, forming an intransitive loop around the 2‐dimensional simplex.

Keywords:   Hawk-dove, dominant strategy, coordination, prisoner’s dilemma, intransitivity, rock-paper-scissors game

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