Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
MacrocognitionA Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Bryce Huebner

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199926275

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926275.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 February 2020

Collective Selves and Collective Personhood

Collective Selves and Collective Personhood

Chapter:
(p.183) 8 Collective Selves and Collective Personhood
Source:
Macrocognition
Author(s):

Bryce Huebner

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926275.003.0008

It is often implausible to hold groups accountable for their claims and actions; in most cases, it is individuals who must be held accountable for their role in collective action. In light of this fact, this chapter argues for the existence of a minimal type of collective cognition that does not require epistemic accountability. This yields a more scientifically plausible account of collective mentality than has previously been advanced, allows for a reconceptualization of claims about collective responsibility, and helps make it clear that collective beliefs and desires are likely to be exceedingly rare types of phenomena.

Keywords:   Collective responsibility, Collective intentionality, Collective belief, Pushmi-Pullyu, Mental representation

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .