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MacrocognitionA Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality$
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Bryce Huebner

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199926275

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926275.001.0001

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Is Collective Mentality Intuitively Implausible?

Is Collective Mentality Intuitively Implausible?

Chapter:
(p.99) 5 Is Collective Mentality Intuitively Implausible?
Source:
Macrocognition
Author(s):

Bryce Huebner

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926275.003.0005

This chapter focuses on commonsense and philosophical worries about collective consciousness and collective personhood. The arguments in this chapter proceed in a highly theoretical way, leading up to the claim that any theory that establishes a necessary connection between consciousness and mentality will require fundamental and untenable revisions to the foundations of cognitive science. These arguments are directed toward philosophers of mind; they address recent research in social psychology and experimental philosophy, as well as the familiar criticisms of functionalism advanced by Ned Block and John Searle.

Keywords:   Collective consciousness, Functionalism, Nation of China, Chinese room, Thought experiments

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