This chapter considers the relationship between nondiscrimination rules and supply-side incentives to invest in infrastructure. It frames and evaluates the oft-made claim that government-imposed commons management will significantly impair incentives to invest in infrastructure. First, it briefly discusses typical assumptions underlying this claim. Unfortunately, tragedy is often assumed rather than demonstrated. A few of the powerful rhetorical devices/analytical heuristics that influence modern debates about nondiscrimination rules are addressed. Next, the chapter considers a series of issues that require context-specific attention in order to evaluate the relationship between commons management and incentives to invest. It ends with two examples of situations where a conflict between commons management and supply-side incentives arises.
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