Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Perceiving RealityConsciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Christian Coseru

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199843381

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199843381.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 21 October 2019

Foundationalism and the Phenomenology of Perception

Foundationalism and the Phenomenology of Perception

(p.192) Chapter 7 Foundationalism and the Phenomenology of Perception
Perceiving Reality

Christian Coseru

Oxford University Press

This chapter, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, calls into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. It argues that the embodied and enactive cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian epistemological legacy of understanding knowledge primarily in terms of justifying belief, can be also found- albeit in a modified form-in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemic inquiries in a version of phenomenological naturalism, the Buddhist epistemologist, it is claimed, adopt a middle ground position between empiricism and rationalism (or nominalism). It also argues for the essential role of first-person accounts of experience in ascertaining knowledge claims. Finally, it claims that the Buddhists share with Quine and other proponents of naturalism the view that causality, not justification, is the determining factor in deciding which cognitive events count as knowledge.

Keywords:   foundationalism, empiricism, phenomenology of perception, Sellars, Merleau-Ponty, Quine, cognitive science of vision, analysis of particulars, representation, enactive perception

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .