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Can Animals Be Moral?$
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Mark Rowlands

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199842001

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842001.001.0001

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Attributing Emotions to Animals

Attributing Emotions to Animals

(p.39) 2 Attributing Emotions to Animals
Can Animals Be Moral?

Mark Rowlands

Oxford University Press

Emotions, in the sense relevant to this book, are identified as intentional states that are individuated by their content. The attribution of such states to animals is thought to be problematic. The problems are identified and resolved in this chapter. A definition of what it is for an emotion to possess moral content is supplied.

Keywords:   emotions, intentionality, content, holism, truth-preservation, Davidson, Stich, animals

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