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Reliabilism and Contemporary EpistemologyEssays$
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Alvin I. Goldman

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199812875

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.001.0001

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Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement

Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement

Chapter:
(p.197) 8 Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement
Source:
Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology
Author(s):

Alvin I. Goldman

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.003.0009

This chapter discusses two distinct topics in social epistemology: epistemological relativism and peer disagreement. It characterizes epistemological relativism by treating it as a combination of three theses. It then proposes a novel version of relativism that may be appealing to firm objectivists. Next, it looks at the relativization proposal, which is supported by the notion of iterative justification. The chapter also gives provisional suggestions for applying these ideas to the peer disagreement problem.

Keywords:   epistemological relativism, peer disagreement, relativization proposal, iterative justification

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