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Reliabilism and Contemporary EpistemologyEssays$
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Alvin I. Goldman

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199812875

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.001.0001

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Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence

Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence

Chapter:
(p.175) 7 Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence
Source:
Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology
Author(s):

Alvin I. Goldman

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.003.0008

This chapter serves as a critical examination of Williamson's theories of knowledge and evidence. It argues that certain details of the theory are less successful than those of similar theories that have been previously defended. It notes that Williamson may have made a mistake in downplaying the process element in process reliabilism (PR). The chapter also discusses evidence, and shows that Williamson holds that a person's body of evidence is the only thing he/she knows.

Keywords:   theories of knowledge and evidence, Williamson, process element, process reliabilism, evidence, body of evidence

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