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Reliabilism and Contemporary EpistemologyEssays$
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Alvin I. Goldman

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199812875

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.001.0001

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Reliabilism

Reliabilism

Chapter:
(p.68) 3 Reliabilism
Source:
Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology
Author(s):

Alvin I. Goldman

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.003.0004

This chapter introduces reliabilism and identifies important objections and counterexamples to reliabilism. It presents a survey of existing responses, including the response to the demon-world problem and the reliable clairvoyant problem. It studies the many forms of contemporary epistemology that share the central features of reliabilism. It discusses the “tracking” theory of Nozick, which serves as a counterfactual reliability theory of knowledge, minus any element of causal processes. Another theory included in this chapter is “virtue reliabilism”, which rather closely resembles reliabilism.

Keywords:   reliabilism, existing responses, demon-world problem, reliable clairvoyant problem, central features, contemporary epistemology, counterfactual reliability theory, causal processes, virtue reliabilism

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