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Reason, Metaphysics, and MindNew Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga$
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Kelly James Clark and Michael Rea

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199766864

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.001.0001

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The Varieties of Accidental Necessity

The Varieties of Accidental Necessity

Chapter:
(p.38) The Varieties of Accidental Necessity
Source:
Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind
Author(s):

Thomas P. Flint

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.003.0004

Philosophers have spoken much in recent years about accidental necessity, especially in connection with arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Some have further suggested that acceptance of the Molinist stance on middle knowledge commits one to denying that accidental necessity is closed under entailment. This essay tries to show that not all of these discussions have shed maximal light on the fundamental issues, and that much of the confusion stems from a failure to acknowledge that there are a variety of distinct notions to which “accidental necessity“ can plausibly be seen as referring

Keywords:   Molinism, middle knowledge, accidental necessity, foreknowledge, Freddoso, Plantinga

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