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Reason, Metaphysics, and MindNew Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga$
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Kelly James Clark and Michael Rea

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199766864

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.001.0001

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Commonsense Skeptical Theism 1

Commonsense Skeptical Theism 1

(p.9) Commonsense Skeptical Theism1
Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind

Michael Bergmann

Oxford University Press

Commonsensism takes common-sense starting points seriously in responding to and rejecting radical skepticism. Skeptical theism endorses a sort of skepticism that, according to some, has radical skeptical implications. This suggests that there is a tension between commonsensism and skeptical theism that makes it difficult for a person rationally to hold both. In this paper, I explain why there is no tension between those two positions. This explanation is then used to respond to several recent objections to skeptical theism. Along the way I offer a theory of error to explain why people mistakenly believe, of some horrific evils, that it's just obvious that a perfectly loving God wouldn’t permit them.

Keywords:   skeptical theism, common sense, problem of evil, argument from evil, suffering, theism, God, atheism, skepticism

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